KURZGEFASSTE LOGIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE. By Dr. K. Kroman. Translated from the second edition of the Original by F. Bendixen. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.
Dr. Kroman is professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. He has sought to present in this book of three hundred and eighty nine pages the elements of Logic and Psychology. The work was principally intended for the use of the general reader and the beginner, although its author hopes it will not be altogether without interest to the specialist, and that it will find its way into the schools of pedagogy (the subject of the art of education being also incidentally dealt with in its pages).
Dr. Kroman's method of presentation is concise and lucid; the elements of logic occupy but some one hundred and four pages, and form a good introduction to the common phases of that science.
But his psychology is, from our standpoint, more open to objection; or rather his philosophy. He says: "Unless we assume the law of causation, research is impossible; but assuming this, it is impossible to stop with states of consciousness, we must assume a subject and real objects." What Dr. Kroman means by real is seen from the following. "Our senses give us knowledge only of properties of things, not of things. We do not perceive the apple, but only its form, color, etc. But all these sensations thus derived form an interconnected whole; and the law of causality forces us to the assumption of a thing behind these sensory manifestations. Yet, our belief that we know this thing in itself has only a practical value; in reality it is an unknown quantity. It is a single point, a nucleus, of which direct and positive knowledge is unobtainable; yet exist it must if our assumption of the law of causation is to be upheld." Thus Dr. Kroman shows in an admirable manner how our everyday conceptual life is formed; but it is the office of philosophy, in our view, to point out how this same conceptual life should be formed. However, Dr. Kroman supplements this explanation—which we have much abbreviated—by considerations that lead one to believe that he seeks only to demonstrate the reality of existence and has collaterally accepted the doctrine of the independent, 'outside' thing in itself. We may refer our readers, regarding this question, to Prof. Mach's article in this number of The Monist.
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EINLEITUNG IN DIE PSYCHOLOGIE NACH KRITISCHER METHODE. By Paul
Natorp. Freiburg: J. C. Mohr.
In this exhaustive monograph Dr. Paul Natorp does not deal with psychology itself, but proceeding from a number of novel points of view he opens up the road by which the principles of psychology may be reached. The author frankly assumes that psychology even as yet has not absolutely and clearly defined its own fundamental problem, and that this is chiefly the reason why we still disagree concerning the significance and value of many of the results of psychology. Before we approach the solution of the special problems, psychology itself must be laid down as a problem. The author, therefore, in the first part of his introductory task has sought to indicate the objects of psychology,—namely, what it will and rationally can pursue; and in the second part, he points out, the only correct method according to which psychology can accomplish its aims.
Since Descartes, says our author, real and possible consciousness constitutes the true limits of the province of psychic research, the fundamental problem of psychology, and the characteristic distinction between the old and new philosophy. But, in order to find out, whether this tendency of the new philosophy has been entirely successful, it will be necessary to examine more closely the nature of the fundamental psychic phenomenon, and the problem that it involves.
In the fact of consciousness we can distinguish several elements which really are inseparable, but which in the study of the problem ought to be separated. There is the content of which one is conscious, and secondly, the consciousness thereof, or its relation to the ego; and, by a further abstraction, this relation itself might be distinguished from the total fact of consciousness. The relation to the ego, in ever varied contents, is one and the same; it makes up both the common and specific element of consciousness, and as the third abstract element of consciousness (Bewusstsein) it might aptly be called self-consciousness (Bewusstheit). The ego, being a common point of relation to all contents of consciousness, cannot itself become the content of consciousness, because it represents a contrast to any idea of content. We do not correctly conceive consciousness as a thing, a cause, a force, an explanatory principle, but simply as a phenomenon—the fundamental phenomenon of psychology. We thereupon ask, what contains this phenomenon, and by what is it characterised? It is, above all, characterised by subjective experience. This denotes, that it is I who am conscious of a content. The reflective expression "I am conscious" implies a "subject" that is conscious. Without this reflective relation to the ego, consciousness no longer conveys any meaning. Consciousness denotes self-consciousness. This reflective relation is therefore the only distinctive mark of all conscious phenomena.
Content we call anything that can be related to the ego. In the language adopted by psychologists, a feeling or a desire can also be regarded as content of consciousness. But our investigation cannot proceed beyond this reflective relation. If we attempt a representation of the ego, we should turn it into object, and we should have ceased to regard it as ego. The ego is never an object—not even to itself.