THE
New Jersey Law Journal
published monthly
VOLUME XLV JANUARY, 1922 No. 1
EDITORIAL NOTES.
At least three decisions of nation-wide import were made by the United States Supreme Court in December. The first, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council we give, probably in full, elsewhere, as taken from the New York Times. It is on the subject of strikes and picketing, and speaks for itself. Another tested the law of Arizona, which made picketing, etc., that tended to destroy an employers business, lawful, and the law was held to be unconstitutional, although by a divided Court, 5 to 4. Among the dissenters was Mr. Justice Pitney. The main opinion was lengthy and explicit, and we think, fair and just. The third was on the subject of the open competition plan by which members of the National Hardwood Manufacturers Associations believed they were getting around the Sherman Act, but are now told by the Court their practices are in restraint of trade. The Association was prosecuted by the Government in the Federal Court at Memphis, and a permanent injunction was obtained against continuance of the practices of filing by hardwood concerns of reports of business operations with a central organization, such reports being open to all other members of the organization. The opinion holding the conduct of the members of the Association to be illegal was delivered by Justice Clark. As usual, of late, there were dissents, this time by Justices Holmes, Brandies and McKenna. The meetings of the members resulted in concerted action, Justice Clarke stated, to raise prices regardless of conditions, and the plan was termed by him misleading and a misnomer and an old evil in a new dress and a new name. He added that instead of a plan to promote open competition it operated to restrict competition. It was futile, he said, to argue that the plan was merely to furnish information which could not be otherwise obtained. The secretary of the Association, through an expert statistician, utilized replies to questionnaires and other information furnished by the members of the Association as the basis for bulletins and advices. These replies also were utilized in predicting and promoting advances in prices, by withholding of products from the market, awaiting higher prices.
In the second case referred to in the preceding paragraph the United States Supreme Court thus laid down the rule as to the secondary boycott: It is to be observed that this [the case in hand] is not the mere case of a peaceful secondary boycott, as to the illegality of which courts have differed and States have adopted different statutory provisions. A secondary boycott of this kind is where many combine to injure one in his business by coercing persons against their will to cease patronizing him by threats of similar injury. In such a case the many have a legal right to withdraw their trade from the one, they have the legal right to withdraw their trade from third persons and they have the right to advise third persons of their intention to do so when each act is considered singly. The question in such cases is whether the moral coercion exercised over a stranger to the original controversy by steps in themselves legal becomes a legal wrong. But here the illegality of the means used is without doubt and fundamental. The means used are the libelous and abusive attacks on the plaintiffs reputation, like attacks on their employers and customers. Threats of such attacks on would-be customers, picketing and patrolling of the entrance to their place of business and the consequent obstruction of free access thereto—all had the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs of their business. To give operation to a statute whereby serious losses inflicted by such unlawful means are in effect made remedyless, is, we think, to disregard fundamental rights of liberty and property and to deprive the person suffering the loss of due process of law.
It is with deepest regret that an announcement in our obituary columns in this issue includes the name of ex-Justice Bennet Van Syckel as a deceased member of the Bar and jurist. Those who practiced under him in the Circuits in former years, or who knew him as the bright, fully-equipped ornament of the Supreme Bench, well understand that his passing cuts off the last link between the Supreme Court of a few decades ago and the Court as constituted to-day. Justice Van Syckel was approaching 92 years of age, and many were the hopes that he would retain his health and vigor of intellect until he reached an even hundred years. The Courts wherein he sat, and the present older members of the Bar will see to it that his merits are officially pronounced; we can only say now that no eulogy to be given to his memory will do him over-justice. His dignity, fairness and sound legal judgment on the Bench were such that he deserved even greater honors than he received and his private life was immaculate. An excellent portrait of the Justice as he appeared in 1905 will be found in the Law Journal of that year (Vol. 28, facing p. 6).