October 30, 1918, there was served personally upon defendant a notice, dated on that day, signed by both the grantor and the grantee in the deed last mentioned, as follows:

“You will please take notice that the premises leased by you from P. Ballentine & Sons by written lease dated the first day of August, 1917, have this day been sold to LaBrecque Company, Inc., and notice of the cancellation of your said lease is hereby given you pursuant to that clause of your lease reading as follows: ‘It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that a sale of the property by the party of the first part shall terminate this lease upon six months’ written notice to the party of the second part, and in lieu of compensation it is hereby agreed that the rent shall be waived during the six months’ notice to vacate.’”

The defendant did not remove from said premises at the expiration of six months and the statutory demand for delivery of possession was personally served on defendant. After the expiration of said period, he refused to vacate the premises, and thereupon the defendant here instituted and prosecuted summary proceedings in the Second District Court of the City of Newark, in which Court judgment for possession of the premises was rendered May 23, 1919, and the removal of plaintiffs, being the alleged act of trespass for which this suit is brought, was, by virtue of the order of removal, made by that Court upon said judgment.

There is no contention that there was any irregularity in the proceedings of that Court, if the Court has jurisdiction; but the plaintiff here insists that the provisions of the lease above quoted constituted a condition, or covenant, and not a limitation of the term, and that consequently the District Court did not have jurisdiction.

The parties hereto have entered into a stipulation to submit this suit to the Court for judgment upon the complaint, answer and reply, which correctly sets forth the facts as above stated, and adds:

“If the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, judgment is to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and there is to be an assessment of the damages by a jury drawn for that purpose, reserving however all questions of law as to the measure of damages; and, if the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant as if said cause had been tried and a verdict in favor of the defendant had been rendered”; both parties reserving the right to appeal from the judgment to be entered.

It is admitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, if the said provision of the lease constituted limitation of McGann’s terms, then the District Court had jurisdiction and the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit.

The jurisdiction of the District Court in such cases is confined in its application to the instant case, to “When any such person shall hold over and continue in possession ... after the expiration of his ... term,” etc. Admittedly the decision of this case rests upon whether or not the sale of the premises and the notice given by the lessor and LaBrecque Company to the plaintiff ended the term of the McGann Company. If it did—if this was a limitation of the plaintiff’s term,—the jurisdiction of the District Court was complete.

The case of Quidort v. Bullitt, 60 N. J. L. 119, is very much in point. In that case it appeared by the affidavit filed with the Justice that the defendants, in May, 1885, leased to the prosecutor a seaside cottage at Cape May for five years, which lease was extended for two successful periods. The lease contained the following provision: “Lessors are to have the privilege of terminating the lease at any time upon giving six months’ notice of their intention to do so, prior to the first day of July or any year during the lease.”. On October 19, 1895, the defendants caused to be served on the prosecutor a written notice, which, after reciting the terms of the lease stated:

“We have determined to avail ourselves of the privilege of terminating the lease. We now give you notice of the exercise of our privilege and of our intention to terminate the said lease on the first day of May, 1896, and demand that you surrender us possession of the leased premises at that time, in accordance with the provisions contained in the lease. This right to terminate the lease is exercised in accordance with the lease and the several extensions thereof. We shall expect you to deliver to us, on the first day of May, 1896, the cottage and bath houses mentioned in the said lease, and also the articles mentioned and set out in the inventory annexed thereto.”