The Attorney-General of the United States, in an address at the last meeting of the American Bar Association in Cincinnati, gave, as suggestions, six rules for the handling of labor disputes. They were:
First—It is an undisputed fact that the public have a right to know what the quarrel is about in every actual or threatened strike or lockout and similar controversies.
Second—There should be some definite agencies in government for ascertaining these facts fully and making an impartial finding by those specially qualified both by temperament and training to do this particular kind of work; and such finding should be reported so that it will be a reliable source of knowledge to which students and publicists and statesmen can resort.
Third—Compulsory jurisdiction over these two factors to compel them to submit to an inquiry of this sort is not only desirable but just.
Fourth—At present our study of this question has not been sufficiently thorough to warrant legislation compelling the acceptance of such findings by the parties thereto. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the proper agency should be obligatory upon the parties to submit to the investigation; the acceptance of the finding by the parties should be voluntary.
Fifth—The experience of the past shows that in most cases full, accurate, reliable publicity has been sufficient to compel an adjustment of these cases. Public sentiment is a controlling factor and it is important, in justice to both of the parties, that it should depend upon something more accurate than successful propaganda.
Sixth—In the course of time knowledge of the nature and causes of these controversies derived in this way may crystallize public sentiment to the extent that laws can be enacted making such controversies impossible.
It will thus be seen that Mr. Dougherty does not favor obligatory arbitration in the case of labor disputes, his view being that public sentiment will decide them. But we have always been clear in our own mind that there must be compulsory acquiescence in the findings of whatever tribunal hears such disputes; otherwise one party or the other will, too often, not acquiesce.
In a recent Chancery case, where an injunction had been ordered by the Court restraining a corporation from doing anything while the matter of a permanent receivership was under consideration, a voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed. In proceedings against certain officers of the corporation for contempt in thus disobeying the injunction, Chancellor Fielder suspended sentence upon the ground that, as a mitigating circumstance, they had been badly advised, and said: I think that the conduct of counsel in the case was absolutely reprehensible. Counsel was bound to know the law, and if he did not know the law, he ought to have had common sense enough to know that an order of this Court restraining any act of the corporation was sufficient to forbid the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. If the order to show cause had been directed to counsel I think I would find him guilty of contempt of Court, and I dont think that any mitigating circumstance could be offered in his behalf.