"What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium 'was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper'—that is, that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and that it was Germany who 'took her responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously.'
"The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of the plain facts.
"First, the German Chancellor alleges that 'England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government.' This allegation is absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906, and again in 1911.
"The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British War Office or the Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely informal character and that no military agreement of any sort was at either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations took place between the British and the Belgian officers it was expressly laid down on the British side that discussion of the military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium for the defense of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a marginal note upon the record explains that 'the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our (Belgium's) neutrality by Germany.'
"As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British officer: 'You could only land in our country with our consent'; and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.'
"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, 'he did not believe England would take such a step because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action.'
"What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: 'I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it.'
"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers he may find one reason in a fact well known to him—namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract. The railways were deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last.
"This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and the other powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by another power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications.
"In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as having thereby 'abandoned and forfeited' her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a 'wrong' had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911.