Two million men were engaged on the German side in October and November when the Kaiser's forces hammered at the Allies' lines in an attempt to break through to Dunkirk and Calais. Around Ypres alone the invaders' losses were more than 120,000 men. These statements are made in a semi-official account of the fighting in Flanders, which takes up three pages of the Bulletin Français, copies of which reached The New York Times on Jan. 11, 1915. As translated, the article in the December Bulletin appears below.
THE hour has arrived when the balance of these last weeks can be established and the results clearly seen. The formidable attempt by the Germans, first to turn the left of ourselves and our allies, and then, that having been prevented, to break through, has entirely failed. By the effort the enemy tried to repair the defeats of the Marne, and they have only added another check to the failure of September.
Meanwhile, in order to invade our territory, according to their old plans the Germans have neglected nothing. On the front that extends from Lys to the sea they massed, in the beginning of October, fifteen army corps, including four divisions of cavalry. Their army heads, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, Gen. Deemling, the Duke of Württemburg, have multiplied their exhortations and appeals to the troops in the effort to maintain the morale of their men.
We have found their orders on dead officers and prisoners, and always they are the same. It is a question of "a decisive action against the French left" or a question of "piercing the line at Dupres or Ypres," for, as one of these orders stated, "the decisive coup remains to be struck, and to accomplish this the allied line must be pierced." This, the orders stated, had to be accomplished at any price and in all haste. They wanted a decision in the western theatre of war before turning to the east.
Then the Emperor himself was with his troops, hoping to animate the German soldiers with his presence. He announced to them that he would be at Ypres on Nov. 1, and that was the date fixed for the annexation of Belgium. In fact, everything had been taken into account, except, of course, the victorious resistance of the allied armies.
To make possible this effective resistance it was necessary for the Allies to oppose the enemy with a force which if not equal to theirs was nevertheless sufficient for the purpose in view.
What was the situation at the beginning of Oct. 1? The Belgian Army came out of Antwerp intact, but too exhausted to participate in the actions then pending. The English Army had left the Aisne to operate in the north. The army of Gen. de Castelnau did not extend on its left south of Arras. The army of Gen. Maudhuy stretched out from that point to the south of Lille. Further on were the territorial cavalry and the marines. This was not a sufficient force to meet the German advance.
Gen. Joffre, the Commander in Chief, ordered Gen. Foch to the command of the armies of the north. Reinforcements were sent him in the ensuing three weeks, and during that period the rail and automobile services operated day and night, hurrying up reinforcements. They arrived on time by divisions and by corps, every man being animated by an admirable spirit.
About Oct. 20 our battle line was from Nieuport to Dixmude, between which places one of our divisions and the marines held the railroad. Meanwhile, just back of them, the Belgian Army was being reorganized. South of Dixmude, and along the canal, our line stretched to the east, forming before Ypres a vast half circle occupied by four French and one British army corps. The line then descended toward the south of Messines to Armientières, forming two sections, the first held by the English and the second by the French.
The German attack had as its object the seizure of Dunkirk, which was necessary if Calais and Boulogne were to be reached. The purpose was to envelop us and cut the British lines of communication to the sea. All the heavy artillery was brought up from Antwerp and made ready for use against the Allies. What happened?