These days were marked by bloody contests. The enemy lost heavily, but constantly gained ground.
At that time we either had to hold the ground under the perilous conditions resulting from the retreat of our left wing or else retreat along the whole front until it were possible to resume the offensive under favorable conditions.
The Commander in Chief decided upon the latter alternative.
The first object to attain was withdrawing in good order while weakening and delaying the enemy by constant attacks. Several of these attacks were brilliantly conducted, especially those of Lanrezac's army at Saint-Quentin and Guise, of Langle's army on the Meuse, and of Ruffey's army further east. They were supported from Nancy to the Vosges by Castelnau's and Dubail's armies. In order to prepare for the offensive a new army had been formed, that of Gen. Maunoury. It was to be concentrated in the last days of August in the vicinity of Amiens.
But the advance of the enemy, by stages of forty-five kilometers a day, was so swift that Gen. Joffre, in order to realize his plan for the offensive, had to order the retreat to be continued.
The army should withdraw to the Aube, and as far as the Seine if necessary; everything should be subordinated to preparing a successful offensive.
On Sept. 5 the conditions which the General in Chief sought to realize were fulfilled—our left wing (Maunoury's army, the English Army, the army of Lanrezac which was now d'Espéray's army) was no longer in danger of being cut off.
On the contrary, the German right, (Gen. von Kluck,) marching to the south toward Meaux and Coulommiers, was exposing its right wing to Maunoury's army.
On the evening of the 5th the General in Chief ordered a general advance, adding: "The hour has come to advance at any cost and to die rather than fall back."