This treaty was signed in the Rumanian capital immediately after the second Balkan war by Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, and, considered in its essential points, was the handiwork of European diplomacy, at whose instance Rumania had entered the war, with the avowed purpose to re-establish the destroyed Balkan equilibrium. Europe had two reasons for interfering in what was then considered as the final settlement of the Balkan question. In the first place, she wanted to reaffirm her authority and predominance over the Balkan States, and, in the second, she considered it as an indispensable part of her Near Eastern policy never to allow much freedom of movement on the part of these same States, which in two successive wars had proved their ability to safeguard and promote their vital interests in spite of all European opposition. To explain this course of European diplomacy one must bear in mind that the Balkan States, since their constitution as such, have always been considered as protégés of Europe, or, to put it more plainly, as not being of age, and therefore deprived of the right and privilege to deal directly with their ancient master, Turkey, in all serious matters in which their most vital interests were involved.
In the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 a congress, in which all of the Great European powers participated, most emphatically affirmed that Turkey was responsible to Europe for any complaints that the Balkan States might have against the Ottoman Government regarding the treatment of their connationals, still left under the Sultan. At the same time the Balkan States received due warning regarding their dealings with Turkey, and were made to take a pledge that whenever they had troubles with the Porte the powers and not themselves were to be the arbiters. All the world knows how Turkey, by constant wire-pulling, secured immunity from Europe for not fulfilling the obligations incumbent on her by the Treaty of Berlin, and how one of the Balkan States, namely, Greece, was left alone and unprotected, to be chastised by Turkey in 1897 for not leaving to the powers the settlement of the Cretan question which had brought about the war.
The European powers, having done practically nothing during thirty-five years for the betterment of the conditions under which the non-Moslem populations had to live in Turkey, were overwhelmed to hear in the Autumn of 1912 the news of a series of alliances concluded at Sofia on June 12 between Bulgaria and Servia, and between Bulgaria and Greece, for the purpose of settling once for all the perennial Balkan question. European diplomacy was slow, as usual, in grasping the meaning of the new alliance, and when, on Oct. 5, 1912, Montenegro suddenly declared war on Turkey, with Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece following suit on the 18th, there was consternation in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and, to a certain degree, in Petrograd.
An idea of the unpreparedness of European diplomacy in the face of the sudden Balkan war can be had by simply glancing at the records of the British House of Commons of the first weeks after the war was declared.
Sir Edward Grey, then and now Foreign Secretary of State for Great Britain, making the first announcement of the rupture between Turkey and the Balkan States, said—exposing the views not only of his Government but of the European concert as well—that Europe, being taken unawares, would not permit any alteration of the Balkan frontiers as the result of the war. After the first victories of the Balkan allies we see Great Britain changing her policy. "The Balkan victors shall not be deprived of the fruits of their victories," Premier Asquith was declaring in Parliament less than a fortnight after Sir Edward spoke. In both these instances the British statesmen were voicing the policy of the European concert taken as a whole. In the first place, the Foreign Secretary was led into believing that Turkey might prove victorious against the Balkan coalition, and the warning about the immutability of the Balkan frontiers was only for Turkey, in case her victorious armies were to cross the boundaries into Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.
When events marked the utter collapse of the Turkish campaign, Premier Asquith came out with the declaration that Europe had agreed on a policy safeguarding the interests of the victorious Balkan allies. This policy was maintained as long as the Balkan victories were confined in their first progress toward Ottoman territory, at the same time leaving the great European interests unharmed. But when Servian troops arrived at Durazzo, and Montenegro entered Scutari while Greece kept pushing on to Avlona and Bulgaria stood before Tchataldja, the European concert was no longer unanimous in safeguarding the interests of the victors.
Austria, seeing her secular dream of a descent on Saloniki definitely destroyed, and feeling at the same time the imperative need of making impossible a Servian occupation of the Adriatic littoral, raised her voice in favor of the creation of an autonomous Albania at the expense of Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.
Italy, and then Germany, joined their ally in support of Albania. Russia, at the same time not wishing to give any greater impetus to the Bulgarian campaign, dexterously manipulated Rumania, which raised at that time her first claims on Dobrudja. France, who for the last twenty-five years has subjected her Near Eastern policy to the exigencies of the Petrograd statesmen, agreed to the Albanian proposals of the four powers, and finally Great Britain, fearing complications, declared abruptly through Sir Edward Grey that the Balkan war was one of conquest, and for that reason subject to European intervention. In this way European diplomacy stepped into the Balkan conflict and took charge of the final settlement of the first war.
The resolution to interfere in the war once taken, the European powers lost no time in finding a way to end the conflict, and with this object in mind they forced on the belligerents two successive armistices, culminating in the two peace conferences of London. These armistices served two purposes from the diplomatic point of view; first, they exhausted financially the little Balkan countries; and, secondly, they prepared public opinion for the acceptance of any peace terms. The second conference in London succeeded in forcing a peace treaty on the Balkan States. With the exception of Bulgaria, who hoped to retain most of the Turkish territory won by the Balkan coalition, every one was dissatisfied with the way the London conference ended.
Turkey, on one hand, was losing more territory than at first imagined, as the result of her defeat, and the loss of Adrianople was especially hard for every Turk.