These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the memorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American papers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in regard to Servia they are indispensable.
In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes that France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield Servia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and jealousy, the like of which—all Hague conferences and pacific unions notwithstanding—the world has never seen before.
We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we are in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.
But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole nineteenth century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the present dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.
Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward. Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.
Germany Bound to Aid Austria.
By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she declared war she did it because she had positive information that in spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russia mobilization was proceeding.
The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public. Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the dominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that she is fighting now.
It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no choice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral issue of the case.
But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of international law and obligations.