The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed
"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"
and he added that Germany strongly desired
"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure."
This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a confidential communication in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that
"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone—
"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize."