Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications." This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the jury. "A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows, compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and, furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted before passing judgment.

Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts." Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the event of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the event of the conflict spreading.

Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition against Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of their sincerity.

No European Solidarity.

Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.

We read: "Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?

Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia, "the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to comply with these demands'—why, if they were justified?" We grieve at the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all justifiable demands are complied with.

Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not—an aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs opposing factions to keep cool.

Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia, Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have been a deadlock.

Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'" Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.