The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark, quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to prevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do three things—first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and, thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.
The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.
Russia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.
The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the "White Paper," are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of Austria and Russia are understood.
Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK TIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete mobilization.
English "White Paper's" Testimony.
Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England promised the Russian-French combination her support.
On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect."
In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.
But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." (No. 106.)