When Leibnitz speaks of atoms it must not be understood that he is a materialist. He is far from it. Indeed, his system has been called a spiritualistic atomistic. Atoms and Elements to him are Substance not Matter. They are centres of force or better “spiritual beings, whose very nature it is to act.” These elementary particles are vital forces, not acting mechanically, but from an internal principle. They are incorporeal or spiritual units, inaccessible to all change from without, but only subject to internal movement. They are indestructible by any external force. Leibnitz’s monads differ from atoms in the following particulars, which are very important for us to remember, otherwise we shall not be able to see the difference between Elementals and mere matter.
Atoms are not distinguished from each other, they are qualitatively alike, but one monad differs from every other monad, qualitatively; and every one is a peculiar world to itself. Not so with the atoms; they are absolutely alike quantitatively and qualitatively and possess no individuality of their own. Again, the atoms of materialistic philosophy can be considered as extended and divisible, while the monads are mere “metaphysical points” and indivisible. Finally, and this is a point where these monads of Leibnitz closely resemble the Elementals of mystic philosophy, these monads are representative beings. Every monad reflects every other. Every monad is a living mirror of the universe, within its own sphere. And mark this, for upon it depends the power possessed by these monads, and upon it depends the work they can do for us: in mirroring the world, the monads are not mere passive reflective agents, but spontaneously self-active; they produce the images spontaneously, as the soul does a dream. In every monad, therefore, the adept may read everything, even the future. Every monad—or elemental—is a looking-glass that can speak.
The monads may from one point of view be called force, from another matter. To occult science force and matter are only two sides of the same substance.
Such a doctrine is of course much objected to by people of the modern age, who pretend to possess very fine analytical powers, and yet are unable to conceive of matter under any other conditions than those cognizable by our coarse senses.
Those who have intellectual difficulties in seeing that Brahm is everything and everything is Brahm must take this doctrine on faith for awhile. A little earnest practice will lead them to see that truth is not attained through reflection, but through immediate intuition.
If we should desire to look upon these monads as matter, I know of no better comparison than with that which has been called Matter in a Fourth state or condition, a condition as far removed from the state of gas as a gas is from a liquid.
If we should desire to look upon these monads as force, I know of no better comparison than with that which Faraday called “Radiant Matter” and which by Crooke’s experiments has been shown to be so much like mere force, or matter completely divested of all the characteristics of bodies that its physical properties have been so modified that it has changed nature and appears under the form of force.
In §8 of the Monadology Leibnitz declares that “The Monads have qualities—otherwise they would not even be entities.” The qualities attributed to them make them appear very much like living rational beings. I am disposed to look upon them as upon those little beings represented by Raphael, as heads resting upon a pair of wings: pure intelligence, or spirits who have not yet attained to bodily life. If they have not a thinking soul, they are at least forces that resemble life. Continuing, Leibnitz (§11) says: “We might give the name of Perfection (Entelechies) to all monads inasmuch as there is in them a certain Completeness or Perfection. There is a sufficiency which makes them the sources of their own internal actions, and, as it were, incorporeal automata.” Says Leibnitz: (§19) “If we choose to give the name of soul to all that has perceptions and desires, in the general sense which I have just indicated, all simple substances or monads may be called souls.”
You see these infinitesimal beings are regarded by the great philosopher very much like intelligent existences; and yet they are very far removed from our conceptions of soul-life and existence. They are like the Elementals of the Kabbala: they never become men.
Continuing his definitions, he says (§60): “The monads are limited, not in the object, but in the mode of their knowledge of the object.” That is, the objective would have no power over them, but they themselves have only a limited knowledge of the objectivity, hence also a limited power. But that does not preclude the possibility of their being the means of the greatest influence upon the objective world—in the hands, namely, of an intelligent human being or spirit. “They all”, says Leibnitz, “tend (confusedly) to the infinite, to the whole; but they are limited and distinguished by the degrees of distinctness in their perception.”