This is but typical of our situation as a whole. When war was declared we had ample potential resources in men, material, and initiative, but we had no army and only an inadequate navy; and while these are being evolved at a prodigious expenditure of labor and money, the enemy is kept from our gates by virtue of no foresight of ours, but rather by the good fortune which has given us powerful allies whose armies and navies are fighting in our behalf.
OUR MILITARY RECORD
Thus has it ever been when America went to war. The pages of our history teem with disasters for which our happy-go-lucky attitude toward all things military is responsible. Curiously enough, in the very face of such a record, flourishes
a popular conviction that the history of our warfare is one of triumph succeeding triumph with monotonous regularity; and that with respect to our armies, if in no other thing, America has far excelled the other peoples of the earth. That this is all a ghastly illusion any one who has access to a respectable library can quickly satisfy himself. The simple truth is that our past military record has been far from extraordinary; that Americans considered as individuals are no braver than other people; and that when these individuals are associated in armies they require much the same degree of organization, equipment, and leadership as other armies do, if the record they make is to constitute pleasant reading for the nation that sends them forth to war.
It behooves us to note in this connection that no other type of human activity calls for so high a degree of organization and discipline as does the waging of civilized war; and further, that as a consequence of the industrial development of the last century the handicap of a nation which is unprepared to defend itself, in a contest with one which has thus prepared, is vastly greater than ever before. The ancient Gauls and Germans were able to wage a respectable fight against so mighty a military machine as the legions of Julius Caesar, and on one notable occasion, a few years later, a great imperial army was utterly destroyed by the forest barbarians. In modern times the small armies of England have marched at will over Africa, and the fanatic bravery of the tribesmen has led to no other result than their more certain and speedy slaughter at the hands of their civilized foemen. Returning to our own history, the American militiaman of Revolutionary days was no match for the British regular; and, popular belief to the contrary, the naval War of 1812 was not won by America. Even were the contrary the case, however, it would avail us nothing at the present time, for the art of warfare and the circumstances of human life have alike undergone a complete revolution during the last hundred years. Mr. Bryan’s fanciful vision of a million men springing to arms at the first note of danger is but an empty myth, but unfortunately it is by no means a harmless one. The nation which neglects to set its defenses in order in advance of the emergency is, under modern conditions, doomed to defeat before war shall have been declared.
But what avail, it may be asked, is it to dwell upon our past military mistakes? None, certainly, unless we are capable as a people of profiting by the school of experience. Thus far, in the matter under discussion, our national good luck, inducing, as it has done, a quite unwarranted feeling of security, has prevented us from doing so. That we are permanently incapacitated from guiding our feet by the lamp of experience, however, the writer at least does not believe. To a limited extent, indeed, in the conduct of the present war, we have already evinced a willingness to avoid repeating our past mistakes. The question of preparation in advance of the conflict aside, the preliminary stage of the current war has been waged in materially better fashion than has that of any of our previous wars. In particular the principle of universal liability to service has been adopted and an earnest effort has been made to provide as officers, men who combine with a high degree of natural capacity at least a modicum of training for the work intrusted to their charge.
These things are well enough in their way, and encouraging as indicative of the development of a more intelligent attitude on the part of our people toward the conduct of the military arm of the government. No longer, apparently, can a runaway boy of sixteen convince a secretary of war, as in the old days, that his desire for a commission in the army entitles him to precedence over graduates of West Point; nor will we again witness the spectacle of our president appointing all the officers of a newly-created military unit direct from civil life on the ground that the country “generally expected” our trained soldiers should thus be ignored. However gratifying this may be, the nub of the present situation lies in the fact that whatever has been done thus far has been with a view solely to meeting a present emergency. The country has not determined upon, and the government has not adopted any permanent or general policy. Sooner or
later the present war will end. Shall we then, as in 1815 and 1865, disband our military force and have recourse once more to the old policy of trusting to Providence for the protection of our liberty and our existence as a nation? Or shall we now highly resolve that the destinies of the American people are too precious, that the success of our great experiment in democracy is charged with too much importance, not alone to ourselves but to the remainder of mankind as well, to justify us in leaving it absolutely unprotected in a world of potential enemies? What would be thought today of a city which should maintain no police department, and for protection against fire should depend upon the unorganized efforts of volunteers? Scarcely two centuries ago, however, even the chief city of the world had no police department, while within the memory of men now living our cities depended upon volunteers for protection against fire.
In these matters the obvious lesson of experience has been thoroughly learned. Professional police and fire departments are the standing armies of our cities, highly organized and constantly alert to protect them from the perils of disorder and fire. The American people will not permanently be content to display a lower order of intelligence in national affairs than it does in those of merely municipal concern. Too long, however, have we confided the protection of our national existence to Providence. We believe it to be the duty of every citizen to exert the full measure of his influence upon his governmental representatives to the end that now, before national disaster shall have overtaken us, a permanent military policy adequate to our protection be adopted.