NEW PROBLEMS
The invention and application of the submarines and the airships unquestionably call for new rules of warfare on land and sea. The German contention that the submarine cannot be held to the requirement of notice and search required of surface water craft would, if allowed, work against Germany if she had a navy and merchant marine afloat. It is because the German fleets, except the submarines, are practically swept from the seas, that the contention of Germany in regard to the submarines now works almost exclusively in her favor. A prominent American manufacturer, who has had much to do with the development of the modern submarine, asserted, in a recent interview, that the United States should concentrate its naval expenditures on the construction and operation of submarine craft. He avers that with a fleet of five hundred submarines of an approved type, efficiently manned, the coasts and coast cities of the United States could be perfectly protected against armed invasion. With such submarines watching, he says, no hostile ships could approach our coast and every hostile troop transport could be easily sunk. This is a question for experts, but it is evident that the development of submarine warfare is going to lead to great changes in the rules of the game. The same may be said with regard to air craft. If a German, French or English aircraft drops bombs behind the enemy’s lines and hits non-combatants, men, women and children, or neutrals, are the nations sending out the aircraft to be held to particular liability? It is evident that the aircraft cannot give notice before the attack, cannot warn the civilians to get out of the way, cannot search the buildings on which they drop the bombs to see if they contain war material. H. G. Wells, the eminent British author, is out with an article in which he declares that the way to beat Germany is through the air; that England must send out aircraft by the tens of thousands and drop explosives all over Germany, blow up their arsenals and ammunition factories, their supply depots of all kinds, and carry the war home to the German people. If such a mode of warfare is adopted by all the nations can any restrictions be placed upon it—and will any restrictions be placed upon the operations of submarine craft?
PEACE BY COMPULSION
Some of the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the plan proposed by the Philadelphia League of Peace meeting are succinctly set forth in a communication from Hon. James Brown Scott in this issue of the World Court. It will be seen that the approval or adoption of such a plan by the United States would place the government and people of this country in a very equivocal position. To begin with, we should have to discard the advice given by George Washington in his Farewell Address, not to entangle ourselves in the wars and politics of European nations; and in the second place we should have to place the Monroe Doctrine in pawn. We should have either to abandon our independence as a sovereign nation, or else place ourselves in the inconsistent attitude of approving the use of force to coerce other powers while refusing ourselves to be coerced; and by implication we would place ourselves in the rôle of a bully to the weaker nations and of subserviency to the strong powers—unless we want to obligate ourselves to join in a war against the strong powers regardless of our preparedness or ability to carry on such a conflict.
The proposition to furnish a contingent to a posse comitatus to enforce the judgment of a World Supreme Court stands on a very different footing. The League of Peace plan would compel us to furnish a force to compel any other nation to come before the Council of Conciliation. The proposition formulated at Cleveland by the World Court Congress was to first establish the International Court by consent and agreement of the Powers, and then to help furnish a posse comitatus in case of necessity, to execute the decrees of the court. Any nation taking its case before a World Court voluntarily, would thereby tacitly agree to submit to the judgment of such Court, and in case it proved recalcitrant compulsion to compel its submission would be justified legally and morally.
PREPAREDNESS AND WAR
At a recent meeting at Cooper Institute one of the speakers was interrupted with the question: “Is Europe to-day an example of peace by preparedness?” The inference of the question was that preparedness for war, so far from preventing war, tends to breed war. This would be true if all nations would disarm. Europe to-day is not an example of peace by preparedness, but of war through unequal preparedness. Only one nation was thoroughly prepared for war, and that nation, in the conflict thus far, has proved the victor on all the battle fronts. If the other great nations had been equally prepared, there would undoubtedly have been no war. Half measures never led to satisfactory results. France and England and Russia knew, or should have known, that Germany was better prepared for war than any nation in all history ever was before. They made a show of preparation, but when the war began they were not half prepared. They had ample warning which they neglected to heed. They are now reaping the bitter fruit of their folly. Preparedness for war is not an insurance of peace if one potentially rival nation is permitted to so far exceed the others as to outclass them. Preparation for war is useless unless it is adequate.
MR. LANSING’S PROMOTION
The promotion of Robert Lansing to be Secretary of State following Mr. Bryan’s resignation is a recognition of the principle of selecting men for public place for demonstrated fitness to perform the duties of the position rather than for political availability. It is not known that Mr. Lansing has any political influence to speak of. But as Mr. Bryan’s assistant he demonstrated the possession of a comprehensive knowledge of international law, sound judgment, and the diplomatic instinct. He has been all along the real Secretary of State whom the President consulted, while Mr. Bryan was merely the figurehead. It is of course an open question whether it would not have been better for the President to appoint a man of national reputation and commanding ability to occupy the chief place in his Cabinet, relying upon Mr. Lansing for the detail and technical work. Such an appointment might have added strength to the Wilson administration, but while Mr. Lansing occupies the place the people of the country will have a comfortable feeling that no foolish mistakes are likely to be made, and that no half baked or hair brained theories will be promulgated to complicate our foreign relations and make our State Department a laughing-stock.