The World Court idea is not new. It has been the thought of eminent men—scholars, churchmen, publicists, occasionally statesmen—at intervals for generations. Our own William Penn put forward in 1693 a plan to prevent wars. In 1795 the famous German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, published his essay on “Perpetual Peace,” a fundamental conception in which was that wars would not cease until all the governments of the world were democratic. The great English lawyer, Jeremy Bentham, whose speculations fertilized so many departments of law and social endeavor, likewise elaborated a plan. Other men at other times, before and since these, have turned their thoughts to this subject. In our own country we have had men such as Elihu Burritt (1810–79) and Charles Sumner (1811–74) who have influenced, not only the people of America, but of the whole world. The first peace society was formed in New York, 1815, followed by one in England the ensuing year. It was Burritt who organized the Brussels Congress of Friends of Peace in 1848 and this was followed by the important gatherings in Paris, Frankfurt, London, Manchester, and Edinburgh. The great congress in Paris (1849) was presided over by Victor Hugo. Then there burst upon the world a series of wars, beginning with the Crimean War and the war in Italy, followed by the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War, and the peace movement was stilled for a full generation. Presently, there came renewed interest. Men began to examine the records of peaceful settlement of disputes; they found hundreds of instances of successful arbitration, our country—direction having been given to it by the Jay Treaty—being distinctly a leader in this field. They found that the awards of the arbitral tribunals were uniformly respected, that it was not necessary to use force to execute the verdict.

It has been suggested that possibly one explanation of this fact is that the more acute questions, over which there was great popular feeling, were not submitted to arbitration. However this may be, the fact is that we had an unbroken record of the acceptance of the verdict of arbitral tribunals until within the last few years. The apparent exception in this record is the arbitration over the Canadian boundary between Great Britain and the United States. It was found that the arbitrator, the King of the Netherlands, had exceeded the terms of the “compromise”—the agreement under which the arbitration was submitted—and the award was set aside by mutual agreement of the two countries, so that this case can not really be looked upon as a refusal by the loser to accept the award.

Within the past few years we have seen arbitrations thrown down by three South American and Central American countries. I do not feel that this, either, is very significant, because of the character of the countries which brought about this break in the long and splendid record. Owing either to their undeveloped condition or to the nature of the people, or both, these countries are frequently unable to maintain law and order within their own borders and are at times either unwilling or unable to carry out the verdicts of an international tribunal. It would therefore seem unfair to let a valuable principle suffer because it has been disregarded by a people whose backward condition makes it unlikely in advance that they will prove equal to the task of living up to it.

From this general criticism of the Latin-American countries must be excepted what are known as the “ABC” countries. Two of them, Argentine and Chile, enjoy a stable government. The stability of the other, Brazil, is less certain but still sufficient to place it among the progressive Powers of the world. This term, progressive Powers, I shall have occasion to use later and therefore should like to define it now. It is a mistake to follow the common disposition of the times and measure progress in terms of numbers—growth of population, pounds of steel, or yards of cotton turned out. Progress is to be sought in things other than the material, in the growth of the ethical, intellectual, and spiritual forces, above all, in justice: social justice, the justice of man to man, justice of employer to employe, justice of the State towards its people, justice written in the law, and justice of nation to nation.

Now, this recognition of the success of arbitration, combined with a realization of the unintelligent methods by which countries regulate their relations with each other, and above all the waste and danger of competition in armaments, led to the call for an international conference which met at The Hague in 1900. No progress whatever was made at the conference on the question of disarmament, for which primarily the conference was called. But there did emerge from it new institutions which were not looked for but which were a real gain to the world. I refer first of all to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which you will remember has decided several difficult questions, among them the Casa Blanca affair between France and Germany, at one time quite acute. There emerged also an international Commission of Inquiry, which, in 1904, proved of the highest value. You will remember that the Russian Admiral Rodjesvensky, emerging from the Baltic, thought that he discovered an enemy in some innocent English fishermen. He attacked them sank a ship and killed several men. Now, in the minds of many men that incident might have led to war the next day—a generation before it would undoubtedly have led to war. But there happened to have been set up by the First Hague Conference this institution, the Commission of Inquiry. The question was referred to it and it was found that Rodjesvensky, however foolishly, still honestly believed he saw in these fishermen Japanese warships. Moreover time was given for national passion to subside. As a result there was no war between Russia and England and in the opinion of statesmen of the day, the fact that there was no war was due largely to the existence of this institution.

Then, too, at the First Hague Conference, Good Offices and Mediation were recognized for the first time as friendly functions. It was agreed that if a country should offer its good offices to two countries on the verge of war, or at war, this act should not be regarded as unwarranted interference but as a friendly act. It was under that institution, you will remember, that Mr. Roosevelt succeeded in bringing Japan and Russia together at Portsmouth and so terminating, earlier than would otherwise have been the case, the Russo-Japanese War. A second peace conference took place at The Hague in 1907. The task of improving the rules of war which had been begun at the First Conference was carried forward at the Second Conference. The Second Congress, moreover, adopted in fact an institution known as the International Court of Prize. Then it adopted in principle the Court of Arbitral Justice, intended to be a true international court of justice, composed of judges by profession, whose tenure should be permanent. This latter institution was to be brought into being through diplomatic channels as soon as the nations should agree upon the method of selecting the judges. The reason the court is not in existence to-day is that up to this time such a method of selecting the judges has not been found, and this is one of the subjects up for discussion this afternoon.

Now, why did the Second Hague Conference vote for this Court of Arbitral Justice when we already had in existence working successfully, the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up by the First Hague Conference? The reasons were several. In the first place, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was not a court of law. Its decisions were to be based upon the principles of law but at the same time its functions were those of arbitration, and, as you know, the main object of the arbitrator is to bring about the settlement of a dispute. That is to say, he is more interested in that, which often involves compromise, than he is in bringing out the true justice of the case which would tend to develop the principles of law and enlarge accepted practice.

Now, those of us who believe in this true court of justice for the world feel that international law would be built up by it in two ways. First, it would grow through the decisions of the judges themselves in cases actually coming before them, the judge being governed by previous decisions of the Court—the way in which the great Common Law of England has grown. That process produces the most natural, healthy, sound, and permanent kind of law. Then it is felt that the existence of this court will invite the codification of certain spheres of law. An example in point is the way in which the provision for the International Court of Prize led to the London Conference of 1908–1909, at which the law of prize was codified. England declined to proceed with the project of the International Prize Court until that was done. Hitherto the law of prize has depended upon the interpretation each nation has placed upon it. One nation might set up as contraband that which another nation declined to accept as contraband. Questions of how long an enemy’s ship should be suffered to remain in a neutral port, whether merchantmen may lawfully be converted into armed cruisers after leaving home waters, and numerous similar questions, were differently answered by different countries. England said “we must know what we are undertaking.” Therefore, at her instance the conference met at London and evolved the London Convention which codifies the law of prize. When the present war began, Germany announced her willingness to accept the Convention. On the other hand, England, who had not yet ratified the Convention (owing to the opposition of the Lords), proceeded to modify it and proclaimed it in this modified form. France did the same. It was accepted in its original form by the United States Senate but not promulgated by the President, who took the position that the United States could not accept a convention in which several nations had introduced their own amendments not agreed to by all. But the history of the London Convention shows how the existence of an international court will invite the codification of certain spheres of international law. I use that term advisedly because it is a tremendous undertaking to codify the whole body of international law, nor is it certain that it is advisable so to do. It may become too rigid.

Now, that project of the Second Hague Conference, the Court of Arbitral Justice, was accepted by the forty-four nations participating in the conference. It was indorsed in 1912 by the Institute of International Law. It has been supported earnestly by all the Powers, including Germany, France, and England; and every lawyer, every man who feels what justice means, approves of it. There is no difference of opinion as to the desirability of putting it into effect. The name of the proposed court, the Court of Arbitral Justice, is misleading. The word “arbitral” does not belong there. It was put in because Germany insisted on its being there. The word “court” carries with it the idea of obligation. When a court in municipal law renders a decision, usually an obligation goes with it. Now, Germany was not ready for anything obligatory in international institutions; therefore her demand. But a true court of justice is none the less provided for by the convention. From time to time for generations, isolated individuals have put forward the idea of such a court. The present movement to create it was really born in the mind of a man who sits upon this platform, James Brown Scott. He was connected with the Department of State under Mr. Root, and, as Mr. Root himself expressed it, he talked with Mr. Root once too often about this court. The result was that the American delegation to the Second Hague Conference went there with instructions from Mr. Root to establish the court if possible. Mr. Scott took an active part in drawing up the convention relating to the court and has been an earnest worker in the cause ever since. He has gotten a lot of us interested in it and may be said to be the father of the modern project.

In 1910 we formed a society known as the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes to promote this court.