The second great thing which the Church can and should do is to insist that our laws shall be so framed and administered as to do justice to Asiatics in this land. Until we do that, can we claim that ours is a Christian land? As a matter of fact, we do not grant the Asiatic a square deal in this country nor give them an open door; yet we demand them for ourselves over there. We do not even give them the courtesy which we secure. The Asiatic is more sensitive to slight or insult than we are. We are thick-skinned. In their civilization courtesy is a highly important element. But we go on in our blunt ways wounding their feelings, and even disregarding their rights. Is it not time for our churches to insist that our laws shall be so modified, framed, and administered as to do them justice and to deal with them courteously?
The Church is facing a new testing time and a new time of opportunity with regard to the relation of the races. The first great testing time of the churches occurred immediately after Pentecost when Jewish Christians thought that Gentiles had to become Jews before they could be Christians and brothers. But the Holy Spirit led them to see that all men are brothers, without becoming Jews, and those early Christians learned even to eat with Samaritans and with Gentiles; they welcomed them into their brotherhood. Now it is the white man who feels that he is the elect race and has special hold upon the grace of God; he looks down upon other races as inferior. But God is teaching us our error. The Asiatic is indeed our equal. I would just as soon sit at the feet of competent Japanese professors as I would at the feet of professors of German or American extraction. We are discovering that Asiatics are as brainy as we are; and that they produce men of splendid character. But it is a question to-day whether and how far our churches are willing to accept the fact that men of other races and colors and even with almond eyes, are our equals. This is a new testing time for the churches and also a time of rare opportunity.
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF A WORLD COURT
BY
WILLIAM DUDLEY FOULKE
In considering the possibilities and limitations of a world tribunal an American naturally turns his eyes to the experience of his own country especially to the development of the Supreme Court of the United States. The history of the development of our National Constitution and judiciary out of the mere league organized by Articles of Confederation, foreshadows in its general features the course which mankind is likely to take in organizing some coming federation of the United States of Europe or of the world. For the balance-of-power statesmanship which has prevailed since the middle ages lead to a condition of very unstable equilibrium which can not and will not continue forever. The civilized world was a great empire once and it will be at some period hereafter either a great empire, with nationalities subjugated or extinguished or else a great federation with nationalities recognized for local and national purposes, but subject to one general control for international purposes. The gradual union of mankind in larger and larger units, first the family, then the clan, the tribe, the city, the nation and finally the empire or the great federated republic will have its final completion in a world empire or a world federation. That will be the only way in which war will ever become extinct and the history of our own confederation and our subsequent federal union is pointing out the method in which this world union can best be established.
Of course we realize that such a change cannot take place at once. Very few stones in this gigantic structure can be laid at one time. Many harvests will ripen and the snows of many winters will cover the earth before the majestic fabric of a world state shall lift its dome to heaven. But the foundation courses have already been laid in the Hague Conferences and the panel of judges; and the one thing most practicable to-day to further the building of this tremendous edifice is the establishment of a permanent World Court. By making this the next stage of development we pursue indeed, not the precise course adopted in the making of our Federal Constitution, but we follow the line of least resistance.
It is evident that the jurisdiction of the World Court at the beginning will be less extensive than that of our Supreme Court to-day. It ought perhaps to include at first only one thing, controversies between nations, and only such controversies as may properly be submitted to a court—only justiciable questions. But what are justiciable questions? They have been defined as questions of law or fact relating to the interpretation of a treaty or the obligations of international law. But this definition is most elastic. International jurisprudence is yet in a rudimentary condition and its principles, many of them, are yet undetermined. No one knows yet just how far they may be extended by the construction of a World Court. When Austria began war against Servia, was that a breach of international law? When Russia determined to come to the aid of a kindred people whom she had taken under her protection and then mobilized for the invasion of Austria, was that a breach of international law? Perhaps most jurists will say, no, these were political questions to be handled by a Council of Conciliation or some other body. Yet all this depends upon construction and upon the determination of what international law really requires. Is not the invasion of the territory of a friendly nation which has given the invader no direct provocation, a breach of international law? Who shall decide? If this question, too, be left to the proposed World Court, that body may decide that anything is justiciable and may assume jurisdiction over questions of vital national policy. Will the great nations of the world agree to that? Will they submit what they consider their most vital interests to any tribunal?
And now we come to the much disputed question whether nations should agree to refer questions affecting their honor and vital interests to an international tribunal. Here we are in this dilemma. If a treaty agreeing to submit disputes to a court, should exclude all questions of honor and vital interests then almost any question may be considered a question of honor or vital interest at the will of the nation so desiring and the treaty will mean very little. On the other hand, if questions of honor and vital interest are included in the things to be submitted, then if a real vital interest is affected, the probabilities are very strong that the decree of the court will not be acquiesced in by the losing party. Germany considered that her vital interests demanded a passage through Belgium into France so the treaty became a “scrap of paper.” America thinks that her vital interests require that no new aggressive military foreign power shall obtain a foot-hold close to our boundaries on our own continent. We feel that our national security requires this. Would we consent to submit this question to a World Court? International law would allow Denmark to sell St. Thomas to Germany or Colombia to sell a strip of land adjacent to Panama for military and naval purposes. International law would allow Mexico to sell Lower California with Magdalena Bay to Japan. A World Court would decide they had the right to do it. Suppose the sale were made and a German or Japanese navy with transports and an army came to take possession, would we submit this question to a World Court? Would we even delay our defense long enough to refer to a Council of Conciliation with the months or years which must elapse before decision during which time the foreign power would go on taking possession, fortifying and garrisoning a naval and military base right at our very doors? Such a position reminds me of the stanza once quoted in Parliament:
“I hear a lion in the lobby roar;