“(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words ‘Carry out Schulung’, be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed. Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, et cetera, and these officers only in person.
“(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength and with their peacetime equipment.
“(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success.”
The rest of the order deals with military details and I think it is unnecessary to read it.
There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig als Überfall).
The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, this document is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, and so it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.
Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives. As I say, although the plan does not mention the Rhineland, it has all of the indications of a Rhineland operation plan. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact that as early as 2 May 1935 the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a Staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, to resist French sanctions against their Conscription Law.
It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.
The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Göring. We have that order signed by Blomberg, headed, as usual, “top secret,” identified by us as C-159. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-54.
The German copy of that document bears the Defendant Raeder’s initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note: “To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy.”