Secondly, as all reports agree, the Defendant Hess is suffering from amnesia. The reports vary on whether this amnesia is founded on a pathological, a psychogenic, or hysterical basis, but they agree that it exists as an unsound mental condition. The defendant is therefore, not insane, but has a mental defect. Legally, therefore, he cannot claim that he is not to be held responsible for his actions; for at the time when the actions with which he is charged were committed, he was certainly not insane, and consequently can be held responsible. It is a different question, however, at least according to German law, whether the defendant is at this moment in a position to follow the proceedings of a trial, that is, whether he is fit to plead. And on the basis of the medical reports which I quoted, I think this question should be answered negatively. He is not fit to plead.
I admit that doubts are possible, that the Tribunal may have doubts whether the answers of the experts are sufficient to establish that the defendant’s ability to plead is actually impaired, that he cannot, as the Tribunal perhaps deliberately phrased it, defend himself adequately. I think that perhaps the emphasis should be on this last point. It is my opinion that the amnesia—this loss of memory confirmed by all experts—is such that the defendant is unable to make an adequate defense. It may be, of course, that he can defend himself on one point or another, that he can raise objections on some points, and that he may be able to follow the proceedings as such. But his defense could not be termed adequate in the sense in which the defense of a person in full possession of his mental faculties would be adequate.
May I add one word. I already mentioned that the defendant told me that he would like to attend the proceedings, as he does not consider himself unfit to plead, but that, in the opinion of the Defense, is quite irrelevant. It is a question which the Tribunal must examine, and in which the personal opinion of the defendant is of no account.
With regard to the conclusion which the American prosecutor draws from the defendant’s refusal to undergo the narco-synthesis treatment suggested by the doctors—that is not a question of truculence. He refused it only because, as he assured me, he was afraid that the intravenous injections at this particular moment might incapacitate him in his weakened condition and make it impossible for him to follow the proceedings; he wants, however, to attend the trial. He refused also because, as I have already mentioned, he himself thinks that he is sound and therefore says, “I do not need any intravenous injections, I shall recover in the course of time.” The defendant also told me that he has an abhorrence of such treatments. I know that to be true, because in the unhappy times of the National Socialist regime, he was always in favor of natural remedies. He even founded the Rudolf Hess Hospital in Dresden, which uses natural and not medical remedies.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I make one observation, Your Honors?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The argument illustrates the selectivity of the memory of which I spoke to you. Hess apparently can inform his counsel about his attitude toward this particular matter during the National Socialist regime. His counsel is able to tell us how he felt about medical things during the National Socialist regime, but when we ask him about anything in which he participated that might have a criminal aspect, the memory becomes bad. I hope that the Court has not overlooked the statement of the matters that he does well recollect.
DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I make a correction?
THE PRESIDENT: It is unusual to hear counsel in a second reply, but as Mr. Justice Jackson has spoken again we will hear what you have to say.
DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I merely want to say that I was misunderstood. It was not the defendant who told me that he always favored natural remedies; I said that from my own knowledge. I said it from my own experience to show that he has an instinctive aversion for medical interference. My remark was not based on the memory of the defendant, but on knowledge of my own.