In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two documents in particular which mark that change.

The first of these was called “Directive for Unified Preparation for War”; issued in June 1937—June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister for War, who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.

“The general political position”—Von Blomberg stated, and I am quoting from the document—“justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia in particular.”

It is true, he added, “The intention of unleashing a European war is held just as little by Germany.” And it may be that that phrase was carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a general European conflict.

But Von Blomberg went on:

“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any time”—yet he had just said that there was no fear of any attack—and “(b)”—and I invite the Tribunal again to notice this phrase—“to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they occur.”

That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggressive war. It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an instrument of policy—the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the pact with Poland, and by innumerable other treaties.

The document goes on to set out the general preparations necessary for a possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938. It is evidence at least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had it in mind to use the military strength which they were building up for aggressive purposes. No reason, they say, to anticipate attack from any side—there is a lack of desire for war. Yet they prepare to exploit militarily favorable opportunities.

Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at which Von Blomberg, Reich Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von Neurath, then the Foreign Minister, were present. The minutes of that conference have already been put in evidence. I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages which make apparent the ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war. You will remember that the burden of Hitler’s argument at that conference was that Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that the process of conquering those two countries might well bring into operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He was prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage:

“The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has proved that every space expansion can be effected only by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost.”