On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:
“In these circumstances”—he said—“I considered it proper to negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest with Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what Germany believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard her future and, on the other hand, what Russia considers important for her existence. From this clear delineation of the sphere of interest there followed the new regulation of Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at the end of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which would lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But England’s hope to achieve an amelioration of her own position through the engineering of some new European crisis, is, insofar as it is concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion.
“English statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they too will learn to understand this in the course of time.”
The whole statement was, of course, a tissue of lies. It was not many months after it had been made that the arrangements for attacking Russia were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder gives us the probable reason for the decision in a note which he sent to Admiral Assmann:
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the Führer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses), surely caused the Führer, as far back as August and September”—this was August and September of 1940—“to consider whether, even prior to victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would be feasible, with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent . . . . The Führer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.”
He may not have spoken to the Navy of his intentions until later in September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly told the Defendant Jodl about them.
Dated the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive of the OKW signed by the Defendant Jodl, and I quote:
“Directions are given for the occupation forces in the East to be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons”—and I quote—“this should not create the impression in Russia that Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive.”
Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertaining to the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service, and I quote:
“The respective strength of the German troops in the East is to be camouflaged by . . . frequent changes in this area . . . . The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops is in the south of the Government General and that the occupation in the North is relatively small.”