“Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.
“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.
“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution.”
That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German Armed Forces marched in.
If the Tribunal would turn over—I think the next document is unnecessary—turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39.
As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations with each other.
On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments—I quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement: