“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.”
That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68.
The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of the interval, summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly Paragraph 4:
“I remarked that this phrase”—that is the passage about the Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following night—“sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.”
That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last document becomes GB-69.
Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for improved relations. They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the interest of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept the condition that the settlement should be subject to international guarantee. They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89, will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71. It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full:
“I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, i.e. that when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.
“Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were . . . .”—and I need not read out the main points.
I go to Paragraph 3: