Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of the British view on the Altmark episode—the Rosenberg report continues:
“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians.”
And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March.
“The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift entry into N”—which is Norway—“with strong forces.
“No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary.”
Then the last entry on March the 3rd:
“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow with a few days interval.”
So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a Norwegian aggression.
The next entry in Jodl’s diary of the 5th of March: