“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states and under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.
“The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities:
“1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organized that they can in the future be considered as German possessions.
“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears practicable.
“2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany’s main body and which, like the Russian solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around Brest and Trondheim . . . .