Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92, and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full:
“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’ present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.
“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.”
As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note, to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to “nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months.
Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle, TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80. This is an extract from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.”
Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939.
We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think, by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2 in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . . neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.”
Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war.