“Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack will not be recognized.”
The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows:
“V.”—that is on Page 2—“I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.”
Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible name.
It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did occur.
The various services which received the order certainly understood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.
So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132.
This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads: