“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
“4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.
“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operations.”
It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command: Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up that point later.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).