I invite the Tribunal’s attention, at this point, to the language of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page:
“The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a ‘new order of things’.”
The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a “stab in the back” on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.”
In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal’s attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible.
Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first paragraph of the English translation:
“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I should like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of all because the present Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse—a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge the present war situation—it is simply impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.”
Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation—the sentence beginning “However . . .”:
“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three-Power-Pact countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and in detail, on the political situation there.”
We have Ott’s reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English translation: