Firstly, I request that the affidavit of the witness Pfaffenberger, which was submitted yesterday, be stricken from the record. The witness himself will later have to be cross-examined, since his affidavit is fragmentary in most important points. In many cases it does not appear whether his statements are based on personal observations or on hearsay, and therefore it is too easy to draw false conclusions. The witness did not mention that the Camp Commander Koch and his inhuman wife were condemned to death by an SS court, among other things, on account of these occurrences. It is, of course, possible to ascertain the complete facts by questioning the witness at a later stage of the Trial. But until then the Tribunal and all members of the Prosecution and the Defense must be continually influenced by such dreadful testimony.
The contents of this testimony are so horrifying and so degrading to the human mind that one would like to avert one’s eyes and ears. In the meantime such statements make their way into the press of the whole world, and civilization is justly indignant. The consequences of such prejudiced statements are incalculable. The Prosecutor clearly recognized the significance of this testimony and exposed the sorry documents in yesterday’s proceedings.
If weeks or months pass before such testimony is rectified, its initial effect can never be wholly eliminated; but truth suffers and justice is endangered thereby. Surely, Article 19 of the Charter does not envisage bringing about such a state of affairs.
Secondly, I should, therefore, like to suggest that at the present stage of the Trial the testimony of witnesses who live in Germany and whose appearance here in court is possible should not be read in the proceedings. For at this stage of the Trial the charges being made are even more terrible than those referring to wars of aggression, since the tortured lives and deaths of human beings are involved.
At the beginning of the Trial the Tribunal refused to admit testimony of the witness Schuschnigg, and it is my opinion that what was valid then should be all the more valid at this stage of the Trial.
I should like to emphasize my suggestion particularly with regard to the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner himself, since it was not until the spring of 1943 that he became Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and since, in the opinion of the Defense, many, if not all, of his signatures were forged and the entire executive function attached to the concentration camps and the things connected with them lay exclusively in Himmler’s hands. That I hope to prove at a later date. I mentioned it now in order to justify my suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear counsel for the Chief Prosecutor of the United States.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd, who had charge of the matter which is under discussion, left for the United States yesterday; and I shall have to substitute for him as best I can.
This Tribunal sits under a Charter which recognized the impossibility of covering a decade of time, a continent of space, a million acts, by ordinary rules of proof, and at the same time finishing this case within the lives of living men. We do not want to have a trial here that, like the trial of Warren Hastings, lasted 7 years. Therefore the Charter sets up only two standards by which any evidence, I submit, may be rejected. The first is that evidence must be relevant to the issue. The second is it must have some probative value. That was made mandatory upon this Tribunal in Article 19 because of the difficulty of ever trying this case if we used the technical rules of Common Law proof.
One of the reasons this was a military tribunal, instead of an ordinary court of law, was in order to avoid the precedent-creating effect of what is done here on our own law and the precedent control which would exist if this were an ordinary judicial body.