“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and air base for the Allies, in particular Russia) Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any vigorous attack before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.”
The foregoing extract from Jodl’s speech makes a good transition to the case of Czechoslovakia—“Case Green,” or “Fall Grün.” I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group.
Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25, may be called to mind. Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the most proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the Armed Forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. From this point on nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl’s diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians, that they were not interested in or not informed about political and diplomatic considerations—that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched were aggressive or not.
When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respectfully suggest: Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl’s diary. They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals, that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions and fully informed on the political and diplomatic developments, that, indeed, German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings; and indeed, if the documents did not show these things, a moment’s thought must show them to be true.
A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone; and this is no doubt true, but it is equally true that an aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and support, and no doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl’s diary which has not yet been read.
That is Document 1780-PS again—the entry for 10 August 1938. It appears on Page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS:
“10 August 1938. The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Führer makes a speech lasting for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Führer’s attention to the defects of our preparations, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remarks of General Von Wietersheim, in which, to top it off, he claims to quote from General Adams that the Western fortifications can be held for only 3 weeks. The Führer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.’
“The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it”—the General Staff—“is prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for political decisions instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Führer. One does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the generals’ opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will encourage the Führer enormously when the right moment comes.”
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for 10 minutes?