The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blomberg and Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Corridor had been annexed. And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part of the Reich; Czechoslovakia occupied; all of western Poland in German hands. Germany was superior in arms and in experience to her Western enemies, France and England.
Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941, when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Italy became an ally of Germany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the western part of the Soviet Union overrun.
I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June of 1941. In this period occurred the aggressive wars in violation of treaties, as charged in the Indictment, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece.
I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these matters by the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving Crimes against Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to review this period briefly from the military standpoint and view it as the German military leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may be sure: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war of conquest, a war for the conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties, non-aggression pacts—these were not the major considerations. They were annoying obstacles, and devices had to be formed and excuses manufactured to fit the circumstances.
Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read, that after 1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler’s methods and lost confidence in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods some of the generals condemned is not stated, but I think the Tribunal will not hear any substantial evidence that many of the generals condemned the march of conquest during the years 1939 to 1941. In fact the evidence is rather that most of the generals were having the time of their lives during those years.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued a memorandum and directive for the conduct of the war in the West. This is Document Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Number USA-540. It is not signed. It was distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Göring, and Raeder. From the wording there is every indication that it was issued by Hitler. I will read the pertinent extracts, starting with Page 2 of the document, about two-thirds of the way down in the first paragraph, starting with the words, “The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war”:
“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million-state”—meaning Germany—“again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words, the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty.
“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”
I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading “Reasons”: