Then we come to the last days before the war, and one interesting side light is that Herr Von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August 1939; and I put in the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Ribbentrop, which is Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138.

I do not intend to read it to the Tribunal because it can be summarized in this way: That the Defendant Ribbentrop has certainly no recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to the Court of St. James after his return. He thinks he would have remembered him if he had seen him and he accepts the probability that he did not see him. And there is the point, when it was well-known that war with Poland would involve England and France, that either he was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador or else, as he rather suggests, that he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In either case, he was completely uninterested in anything which his ambassador might have to tell him of opinion in London or the possibility of war. And I conceive myself speaking with great moderation in putting it this way. That in the last days before the 1st of September 1939 this defendant did whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the incursion of the war which we know he wanted. He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France. These details were given in full by Colonel Griffith-Jones; I am not going through them again. But I have, for the convenience of the Tribunal, referred to the transcript at Pages 1000 to 1059 (Volume III, Pages 219 to 261), and M. Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of October 1939, which is Document TC-73, Number 147, which is Exhibit GB-27.

Now these are the actions of this defendant in the Polish matter. I am glad to inform the Tribunal that with regard to the other countries they are very much shorter than with regard to Poland.

I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of the fact, if it cares to take cognizance thereof, that on the 31st of May 1939 the Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that “the German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind against one another.” This is Exhibit GB-77, Document TC-24. And just to fix the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Denmark and at the same time they invaded Norway.

With regard to Norway there are three documents which show that this defendant was fully informed of the earlier preparations for that act of aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my friend, Major Elwyn Jones, did indicate with some particularity the relations between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But Rosenberg in this case also required the help of the Defendant Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn to Document 957-PS, which I am putting in as GB-139, they will see the first of the documents which connect this defendant with the earlier Quisling activities.

The first one, Document 957-PS, is a letter from Defendant Rosenberg to this defendant and it begins:

“Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop:


“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Geheimrat Von Grundherr, who will address you on this subject. We agreed the other day that 200,000 to 300,000 Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that . . . Grundherr states that the second instalment can be made available only after 8 days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment be given to him at once. With a longer absence . . . the connection with your representatives would also be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavorable.