“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his”—Schacht’s—“opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”
To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) for evidence of Schacht’s having subsidized the Nazis’ preliminary agitation in Austria.
In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler’s intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reich’s debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.
Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward armed aggression.
We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht’s loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.
Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Göring and Schacht, in which Göring, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) Schacht’s loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression.
There was an issue of policy between Göring and Schacht, but it was concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Göring was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Göring; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Göring’s intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out.
I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:
“President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: Schacht returned from the Führer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Führer.