He was well aware of their aggressive designs and I submit he assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered, as I have submitted, their brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all these conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is in fact true that the extension of war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.
I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to Document C-161, at Page 35 of the document book, which is an extract, Exhibit GB-230, from a memorandum of Raeder, dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for Conducting the War by the Powers Signatory to the Three Power Pact.” The material entry reads:
“. . . it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power, and range.
“In 1939, the war having begun 5 years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages. . . .”
The Tribunal will see from that document how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. The Tribunal has seen that Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on an inoffensive Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. But his further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943, Raeder retired, and thereafter he was a leader in name only.
I invite the Court’s attention to the Document D-655, at Page 108 of the document book, Exhibit GB-231, which is a record in Raeder’s handwriting of his interview with Hitler on the 6th of January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement. I am only proposing to read the fifth paragraph, in which Raeder records:
“. . . if the Führer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest character and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to the Inspector General, giving appropriate publicity in the press, et cetera. But a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of Inspector General, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.
“The Führer”—the record reads—“accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The Inspector General could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, et cetera. The name of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had repeated his request, the Führer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He would like to think over the details.”