This list, which already includes the grievances against the defendants enumerated in the Indictment and from which we have just quoted a few facts, is significant because the War Crimes which it encompasses all present a composite character. They are crimes against both international law and national law. Some of these crimes constitute attacks on the fundamental liberties and constitutional rights of peoples and of individuals; they consist in the violation of public guarantees which are recognized by the constitutional Charter of the Nations whose territories were occupied; violation of the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity which France proclaimed in 1789 and which the civilized states guarantee in perpetuity. These War Crimes are violations of public international law, since they represent a systematic refusal of acknowledgment of all respective rights of both occupying and occupied power; but they also may be analyzed as violations of public national law, since they mean forcibly transforming the constitutional institutions of the occupied territories and the juridical statute of their inhabitants.
More numerous are crimes which constitute attacks on the integrity of the physical person and of property. They are allied with war law regulations and include violations of international law and customs.
But the international conventions, it should be noticed, determine the elements constituting an infraction more than they actually establish that infraction itself. The latter existed before in all national legislatures; it was to some extent a part of the juridical inheritance common to all nations; governments agreed to affirm its international character and to define its contents. International penal law is thus superimposed on national law, which preserves its repressive basis because the war crime remains, after all, a crime of common law. National penal law gives the definition of this. All the acts referred to in Article 6 of the Charter of 8 August 1945, all the facts encompassed by the third Count of the Indictment of 18 October 1945 correspond to the infractions of common law provided for and punished by national penal legislation. The killing of prisoners of war, of hostages, and of inhabitants of occupied territories falls, in French law, under Articles 295 and following of the Penal Code, which define murder and assassination. The mistreatment to which the Indictment refers would come under the heading of bodily injuries caused intentionally or through negligence which are defined by Articles 309 and following. Deportation is analyzed, independently of the murders which accompany it, as arbitrary sequestration, which is defined by Articles 341 and 344. Pillage of public and private property and imposition of collective fines are penalized by Articles 221 and the following of our Military Code of Justice. Article 434 of the Penal Code punishes voluntary destruction, and the deportation of civilian workers may be compared with the forced conscription provided for by Article 92. The oath of allegiance is equivalent to the exaction of a false oath in Article 366, and the Germanization of occupied territories may be applied to a number of crimes, the most obvious of which is forced incorporation in the Wehrmacht in violation of Article 92. The same equivalents can be found in all modern legislative systems and particularly in German law.
The crimes against persons and property of which the defendants are guilty are provided for by all national laws. They present an international character because they were committed in several different countries; from this there arises a problem of jurisdiction, which the Charter of 8 August 1945 has solved, as we have previously explained; but this leaves intact the rule of definition.
A crime of common law, the war crime is, nevertheless, not an ordinary infraction. It has a character peculiarly intrinsic—it is a crime committed on the occasion or under the pretext of war. It must be punished because, even in time of war, attacks on the integrity of the physical person and or property are crimes if they are not justified by the laws and customs of war. The soldier who on the battlefield kills an enemy combatant commits a crime, but this crime is justified by the law of war. International law therefore intervenes in the definition of a war crime, not in order to give it essential qualification but in order to fix its outer limits. In other words, every infraction committed on the occasion or under the pretext of hostilities is criminal unless justified by the laws and customs of war. International law here applies the national theory of legitimate defense which is common to all codes of criminal law. The combatant is engaged in legitimate defense on the battlefield; his homicidal action is therefore covered by a justifying fact. But if this justifying fact is taken away the infraction, whether ordinary crime or war crime, remains in its entirety. To establish the justifying fact, the criminal action must be necessary and proportional to the threat to which it responds. The defendants, against whom justice is demanded of you, can plead no such justification.
Nor can they escape their responsibility by arguing that they were not the physical authors of the crimes. The war crime involves two responsibilities, distinct and complementary: that of the physical author and that of the instigator. There is nothing heterodox in this conception. It is the faithful representation of the criminal theory of complicity through instructions. The responsibility of the accomplice, whether independent or complementary to that of the principal author, is incontestable. The defendants bear the entire responsibility for the crimes which were committed upon their instructions or under their control.
Finally, these crimes cannot be justified by the pretext that an order from above was given by Hitler to the defendants. The theory of the justifying fact of an order from above has, in national law, definite fixed limits; it does not cover the execution of orders whose illegality is manifest. German law, moreover, assigns only a limited rule to the concept of justification by orders from above. Article 47 of the German Military Code of Justice of 1940, although maintaining in principle that a criminal order from a superior removes the responsibility of the agent, punishes the latter as an accomplice, when he exceeded the orders received or when he acted with knowledge of the criminal character of the act which had been ordered. Goebbels once made this juridical concept the theme of his propaganda. On 28 May 1944 he wrote in an article in the Völkischer Beobachter, which was submitted to you by the American Prosecution, an article intended to justify the murder of Allied pilots by German mobs:
“The pilots cannot validly claim that as soldiers they obeyed orders. No law of war provides that a soldier will remain unpunished for a hateful crime by referring to the orders of his superiors, if their orders are in striking opposition to all human ethics, to all international customs in the conduct of war.”
Orders from a superior do not exonerate the agent of a manifest crime from responsibility. Any other solution would, moreover, be unacceptable, for it would testify to the impotence of all repressive policy.
All the more reason why orders from above cannot be the justifying fact for the crimes of the defendants. Sir Hartley Shawcross told you with eloquence that the accused cannot claim that the Crimes against Peace were the doing of Hitler alone and that they limited themselves to transmitting the general directives. War Crimes may be compared to the will for aggression; they are the common work of the defendants; the defendants bear a joint responsibility for the criminal policy which resulted from the National Socialist doctrine.