[Quoting.] “I have also obtained a certain number of replies from German generals which I believe could have been subsequently used—from General Jodl, who in the month of May last signed at Reims the unconditional surrender of Germany and from General (subsequently Marshal) Keitel, who a few weeks later was to sign in Berlin the ratification of this surrender. In this way I led them to declare in the most categorical manner that in no event would they interfere with administration, that the rights which they claimed for themselves under the convention were purely and simply those which in similar circumstances international law and international usage concede to occupation armies, that is to say, those indispensable for the maintenance of security, transportation, and the food supply needs of these armies.”
These assertions and promises on the part of the Germans were therefore formal. Now, even at that time, they were not sincere. Indeed, not only did the Germans subsequently violate them, but from the very beginning they organized a system whereby they were enabled to accomplish these violations in the most efficacious manner and at the same time in a manner which enabled them to some extent to mask them.
As far as economy and labor are concerned, this German system comes from a very simple idea. It consisted in supervising production at its beginning and its end. On the one hand, the Germans embarked immediately upon the general requisitioning of all raw materials and all goods in the occupied countries. Thenceforth, it would depend upon them to supply, or not to supply, raw material to the national industry. They were thus in a position to develop one branch of production rather than another, to favor certain undertakings, and, inversely, to oblige other undertakings to close down. As events and opportunities demanded, they organized this appropriation of raw materials, principally with a view to facilitating their distribution in their own interest but the principle was continuously maintained. They thus held, as it were, the key of entrance to production. On the other hand, they also held the exit key, that is to say, of finance. By securing the financial means in the form of the money of an occupied country, the Germans were able to purchase products and to acquire, under the pretense of legality, the output of the economic activity of the country. In point of fact, the Germans obtained for themselves from the outset such considerable financial means that they were easily able to absorb the entire productive capacity of each country.
If the Tribunal finds it suitable, I will interrupt at this point.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 18 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY
Friday, 18 January 1946
Morning Session
M. FAURE: Mr. President, Your Honors. At yesterday’s session I explained to the Tribunal the principles of the provisions made by the Germans to ensure the seizure of raw materials and the control of finance in the occupied countries.
These provisions will be demonstrated by numerous documents which will be presented to the Tribunal in the course of the presentation of the case on economic spoliation and forced labor. I shall not quote these documents at this moment since, as I pointed out yesterday, the purpose of my introduction is limited to the initial concepts of the Germans in these matters. I shall cite only one document, which reveals the true intentions of the Germans in the very first period. This document bears our Document Number RF-3 (bis), and I offer it in evidence to the Tribunal.