THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there:
“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, as the latter finishes off one of the uncertain neutrals. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Führer) suggested, particularly with regard to Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the Western Democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is, in a sense, a natural ally of Italy and Germany.”
Then missing a sentence:
“At the moment of a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis.”
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia and that Italy could count on German support.
Then Von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein and that he was expecting to sign the protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin.
This is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the one at which the Tribunal has just been looking, and the passage with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first page—if I might just read a very short extract:
“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia the Foreign Minister stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone and in which Italy would be certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance.”