I shall immediately answer that this text does not lay down rules relating to the conduct of the occupant in enemy territory. These last prescriptions are contained, I repeat, in Articles 42 to 56, but they referred to the conduct, which the belligerents must observe in the course of the combat.

The words “to seize” in the sentence, “. . . to seize enemy property except in cases where . . . these seizures are absolutely demanded by military necessity,” mean—and there can be no discussion as to translation because actually the French text is binding—the words “to seize” mean not to appropriate a thing, but to put it under the protection of the law with a view to leaving it unused, in the state in which it was found, and keeping it for its true owner or for whoever can show right to it. Such a seizure permits the military authority, as long as the action lasts, to prevent the owner from using the property against its troops, but it does not authorize the military authority in any case to appropriate it for itself.

Acts of economic plunder are all contrary to the principles of international law and furthermore are formally provided for by Article 6b of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 1945.

These constant violations of the Hague Convention had the result of enriching Germany and permitted her to continue the war against Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, while they ruined the invaded countries, the populations of which, subjected to a regime of slow famine, are now physically weakened and, but for the victory of the Allies, would be on the road to progressive extermination.

These inhuman deeds therefore constitute War Crimes which come within the competency of the International Military Tribunal as far as the leaders of the Reich are concerned.

Before finishing this rapid summary of juridical questions, the Tribunal will permit me to refute in advance an argument which will certainly be presented by the Defense, especially as far as economic plunder is concerned. They will claim that your high jurisdiction did not exist, that international penal law had not yet been formulated in any text when the defendants perpetrated the acts with which they are at present charged, and that therefore they could not be condemned to any sentence whatsoever by virtue of the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws.

Why, Gentlemen, is this principle adopted by modern legislation? It is indisputable that any person who is conscious of never having violated any legal prescription could not be condemned because of acts which were committed in such circumstances.

For example, somebody issues a check without funds to cover it, before his country had adopted a penalty for such an offense. But the case which is submitted to you is quite different. The defendants cannot maintain that they were not conscious of having violated legislation of any kind. First of all, they violated international conventions: The Hague Convention of 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1938, and then they violated all the penal laws of the invaded countries.

How, in these proceedings, shall economic plunder be qualified? Theft, swindling, blackmail, and even, I will add, murder—since, in order to attain their aims, the Germans have premeditated and committed numerous murders which enabled them to intimidate the population in order to plunder them better.

From the point of view of domestic law, these deeds certainly fall under the application of Articles 295 and the following ones of the French penal code, and especially of Article 303, which stipulates as guilty of murder all offenders, of whatever category, who, to execute their crimes, resort to torture or perpetrate barbarous acts. I will add that the defendants violated even the German criminal code, in particular under Articles 249 and following.