By the decision of 4 August 1940, it was moreover prescribed that the carrying out of clearing would henceforth no longer be entrusted to the National Bank of Belgium but to the issuing bank in Brussels, which, as I have already had the honor of pointing out, had been established by the occupying power and was under their absolute control.
2) The Germans laid down a second measure whereby all debtors resident in the Reich should pay their Belgian creditors by way of the open account at the issuing bank in Brussels, at the following rate of exchange; 100 belgas to 40 marks, that is to say, 1 mark for 12.50 Belgian francs.
These arrangements, moreover, were extended to the countries occupied by Germany with a view to facilitating their operations in those countries; they were even extended to certain neutral countries by various similar decrees appearing in the ordinance book.
The mission of the issuing bank in Brussels consisted, therefore, on the one hand, of receiving payments from all persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign engagements and, on the other hand, to pay those persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign credit.
In other words, every time an exporter delivered goods to an importer of another country which belonged to the clearing system, it was the issuing bank which settled the invoice and which entered as equivalent, in the ledgers, a corresponding credit at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse in Berlin—the German Clearing Institute in Berlin. In the case of imports, the inverse procedure was followed.
In fact, under the German direction, this system functioned to the detriment of the Belgian community which, at the moment of the liberation, was creditor in clearing to the extent of 62,665 million Belgian francs. It was the National Bank of Belgium which had been forced to make advances to the issuing bank to balance the account of the German Clearing Institute.
A large number of operations made through clearing had no commercial character whatever but were purely and simply military and political expenses.
From information given by the Belgian Government, the clearing operations could be summarized in the following manner—and I take the figures from a report of the Belgian Government previously cited, which has been presented as Document Number RF-146: Of the total transactions, 93 percent were Belgium-German clearing operations; merchandise amounted to 93 percent, and services 91 percent.
If one considers the part taken respectively by merchandise, services, or capital, one obtains a very significant picture. The entire clearing transactions of Belgium with foreign countries totalled, on 2 September 1944, the sum of 61,636 million Belgian francs, of which 57,298 million were for Belgium-German operations, 4,000 million only with France, 1,000 million with the Netherlands, and 929 million with other countries.
It is only in the sector of goods and services that the want of equilibrium is apparent due in large measure to requisitions of property and services made by Germany for her own account. It is known that the so-called exports affected especially metals and metal products, machines, and textile products, nine-tenths of which were seized by the Reich, which made itself thereby guilty of real spoliation.