M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd would like to give some explanations.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, with reference to the prospective witness Pfaffenberger, over the weekend it occurred to us, after talking with him, that perhaps if Defense Counsel had an opportunity to talk to him we might save some time for the Court. Accordingly we made this Witness available to Dr. Kauffmann for conversation and interview; he has talked with him as long as he has pleased, and has notified us that in view of this conversation he does not care to cross-examine him, and as well other Counsel for the Defense have no desire to cross-examine him.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness Pfaffenberger can be released?
MR. DODD: That is what we would like to do, at the order of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. FAURE: Gentlemen, during the last session I reached the end of the first period of the German occupation of Denmark. In connection with that first period I should like still to mention a circumstance which is established by the Danish report, Document Number RF-901, second memorandum, Page 4. I quote:
“When the German aggression against Russia took place on 22 June 1941”—that is the third book of the report—“one of the most serious encroachments was made on the political liberties which the Germans had promised to respect. They forcibly obliged the government to intern the Communists, the total number of which was 300.”
The explanations which I gave in the previous session related to the improper interference on the part of the first instrument of German usurpation, the diplomatic representation.
The second instrument of German interference was, as might be expected, the local National Socialist Party of Fritz Clausen, about which I spoke previously. The Germans hoped that in the favorable circumstances of the occupation, and thanks to the support they would bring to it, this party might develop enormously. But their calculations were completely wrong. In effect, in March 1943 elections took place in Denmark; and these elections resulted in the total defeat of the Nazi Party. This party obtained only a proportion which represented 2.5 percent of the votes, and it obtained only 3 seats out of 149 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. I point out to the Tribunal that in some copies of my brief there is a printing mistake and that 25 percent is indicated instead of 2.5 percent, which is the correct figure and which shows what very little success the Clausen party had at the elections.
The conduct of the Germans in Denmark showed a notable change in the period following the month of August 1943. The first reason for this change was clearly the failure of the plan which consisted in seizing power in a legal manner, thanks to the aid of the Clausen party. On the other hand, about the same time, the Germans were equally disappointed in another direction. They had sought, as has been shown in my brief on economic questions, to mobilize Danish economy for the benefit of their war effort. But the Danish population, which had refused political nazification, did not wish to lend itself to economic nazification either. And so the Danish industries and the Danish workmen offered passive resistance, and by a legitimate reaction against the irregular undertakings of the occupying power they organized a sabotage program. There were strikes accompanied by various incidents. Faced with this double failure, the Germans decided to modify their tactics.