If one remembers somewhere having heard in the course of this case, Hitler saying that he had of course no intention of abiding by that agreement at all, that that would never do. . . .
I go on with that document. He then says that Germany must win the war. He says that the bombing of England had only just started and only just started with the greatest reluctance. As he puts it at the top of Page 2, the German production of U-boats was enormous. They had enormous raw material resources in occupied territory, and the confidence in Hitler and in final victory in Germany was complete; and that there was no kind of hope for any revolution among the German people.
He gave his reasons for his flight, his personal reasons again, that he was horrified at the prospect of a long war. England could not win, and therefore she had better make peace now. He said the Führer entertained no designs against England. He had no idea of world domination, and he would greatly regret the collapse of the British Empire.
I quote from the last three lines of the large paragraph in the center of the page:
“At this point Hess tried to make my flesh creep by emphasizing that the avaricious Americans had fell designs upon the Empire. Canada would certainly be incorporated into the United States.
“Reverting to Hitler’s attitude, he said that only as recently as May 3rd, after his Reichstag speech, Hitler had declared to him that he had no oppressive demands to make of England.
“The solution which Herr Hess proposed was that England should give Germany a free hand in Europe, and Germany would give England a completely free hand in the Empire, with the sole reservation that we should return Germany’s ex-colonies, which she required as a source of raw materials. I asked, in order to draw him on the subject of Hitler’s attitude to Russia, whether he included Russia in Europe or in Asia. He replied, ‘In Asia’. I then retorted that under the terms of his proposal, since Germany would only have a free hand in Europe, she would not be at liberty to attack Russia. Herr Hess reacted quickly by remarking that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied either by negotiation or as the result of a war. He added, however, that there was no foundation for the rumors now being spread that Hitler was contemplating an early attack on Russia.
“I then asked about Italian aims and he said that he did not know. I replied that it was a matter of some importance. He brushed this aside and said that he was sure that Italy’s claims would not be excessive. I suggested that Italy scarcely deserved anything, but he begged to differ. Italy had rendered considerable services to Germany; and, besides, England had compensated defeated nations like Romania after the last war.
“Finally, as we were leaving the room, Herr Hess delivered a parting shot. He had forgotten, he declared, to emphasize that the proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues, who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Führer could negotiate.”
My Lord, presumably when he came over he was not attempting to be funny. One can only conclude from these reports that at that time the people in Germany and the German Government really had no kind of idea of what the conditions in England were like at all; but throughout it appears that this man thought England was ruled by Churchill and a small war-mongering gang. It only needed him to come over and make a peace proposal for Churchill to be turned out in the course of two or three days.