These notes are signed by Hewel.
It would now be opportune to refer once again to a document which has already been mentioned in the Tribunal. I mean a so-called top-secret document, for officers only, of the 30th of May 1938. It bears the number OKW 42/38, and under Document Number 388-PS has already been presented to the Tribunal by my honorable colleagues of the United States Delegation. The Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. likewise referred to this document in his opening statement.
Formulating the gist of the fascist conspiracy against Czechoslovakia, Hitler announced that it was his irrevocable decision to defeat Czechoslovakia in the immediate future and by one single military operation. He divided his task into two parts: political and military. Then, with his characteristic and unbounded cynicism, he declares—his quotation is to be found on Page 209 of Volume I, Part 1 of the document book:
“The most favorable, both from the political and military standpoint, would be a lightning blow to be delivered under the pretext of some incident which will provoke Germany to abrupt action. . . .”
The document bears Hitler’s signature. Such was the authentic program of Hitler and his accomplices concerning Czechoslovakia, drawn up for a long time in advance of the day when Chvalkovsky requested that criminal “to address from time to time a few kind words to the Czech people.”
Even if in his public utterances Hitler sometimes used what Chvalkovsky called “kind words,” the line of the actual relations was developing in an entirely different direction. But even this is not all. We shall postpone the question of the provocative incident until the end.
The notes to the report on Fall Grün of 24 August 1938 have already been read into the record in the most important part, as Document Number 388-PS. Here are two additional paragraphs which should be read. Your Honors will find on Page 214 of Volume I of the document book:
“Fall Grün will start with the creation of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany a pretext for military intervention.
“It is of the greatest importance to fix the exact day and hour for staging the incident.
“This incident must be provoked under weather conditions favorable for our superior air force in carrying out the operation and it should be timed in such a way that the respective notification should authentically reach us by midday of X-1 Day. This will enable us to follow it up immediately by issuing the order X, on X-1 Day, at 1400 hours.”