The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, et cetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia’s geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, et cetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention.
With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.
PAULUS: [Continuing] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed by about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.
In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?
[To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?
PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?