I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.
Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.
This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany’s Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind was brewing against the Balkans.
The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.
The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.
I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East.
I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.
On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni’s deposition, it is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:
“In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”
On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues: