However, the generosity of the fascist Führer, who gave Soviet territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.
I have here before me one of Hitler’s letters to Ion Antonescu, dated 25 October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240). Something like 2 years and 3 months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Romanian satrap on the seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been worrying over the question of organizing a “unified” administration in Transnistria. Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now writes—I quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you will find on Pages 82-83 of your document book:
“My further request concerns the essential exploitation of Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army Groups A and South it should not be hampered by any formal juridical or economic considerations and difficulties. I must further request you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the entire network of the Transnistrian railways. . . .”
As a poor consolation Hitler adds—Page 82 of the document book:
“All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the preservation of Transnistria for Romania.”
Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently assured Hitler of his submissiveness, reached the end of his endurance. On 15 November 1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler. In this letter Antonescu wrote unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the will of his master at the expense of his people.
I present Antonescu’s letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239 (Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15 November 1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter, towards the end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of the document book:
“As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit of a banker the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, et cetera.
“I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety.
“I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000 million lei; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8 million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves; that we are bearing heavy expenses incurred in supporting the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle.”