Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September 1942 he commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy War Minister of Hungary.
Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should like to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4 of the Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the document book:
“The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a decision which was of little profit to Hungary. The district of Megyes-Kissármés, where natural oil could be obtained, was reserved for Romania. In Hungarian political and military circles this was interpreted in such a way that in the Second Vienna Arbitration Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance with Romania in the war against Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Romania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would undoubtedly need Romania’s southern wing which extends to the Black Sea.
“In an official conversation which took place towards November 1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following:
“ ‘The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy of Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler.’ ”
I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented to the Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:
“In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not been spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me to understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of the decision previously adopted on the question of Transylvania.”
However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant Ribbentrop expressed an entirely opposite point of view.
I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Göring under these circumstances. I submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235 (Document Number USSR-235), containing the minutes of one of the subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler, which took place on 3 April 1942. This document will be found on Pages 113-116 of the document book. I shall read some excerpts from this document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which corresponds to Page 113 in the document book. I quote:
“I”—Antonescu—“reminded him”—Hitler—“that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press after Ribbentrop’s visit to Budapest that should they intervene”—that is, should they send their troops—“Transylvania is to remain Hungarian; such rumors circulate, and they greatly demoralize the Romanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, and that this does not correspond to actual facts.”