[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 13 February 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.
GEN. ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that Plan Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid action, a combat line for the German-fascist invaders which would place the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The final aim, according to Plan Barbarossa, was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.
The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at the meeting in Hitler’s headquarters on 16 July 1941. This document was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number L-221. You will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler, Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.
The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Bialystok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were declared as “annexed” to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Romania, while Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad region.
As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at general headquarters, on 16 July 1941, Hitler, for instance, said that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to tactical intentions.
The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20 June 1941, at a conference on the Eastern question—a record of which was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number 1058-PS—that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt from Rosenberg’s declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document book.
Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga. The specter of a “Greater Germany” ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear that the opportunity had arrived about which Defendant Rosenberg spoke when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that “certain political slogans could be made public.”