THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you answer the President with respect to the question of whether the conspirators joining later became responsible? If that were true, then this defendant would be responsible for acts running back to 1921.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There are two legal conceptions which have to be borne in mind in considering that point. I can only speak with knowledge on the law of England, but I understand that the law of the United States is very much the same.
In England there is a common law offense of conspiracy. There are also certain statutory offenses, but there is a common law offense of conspiracy. The gist of that offense is, as I have already stated, entering into an agreement to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. As far as a conviction for conspiracy per se is concerned, there is no doubt about the law of England. If someone joins a conspiracy at a late state, a conspiracy to do any illegal act, he can be convicted of conspiracy to do that act however late he joins.
The usual analogy, with which I am sure the learned American Judge is familiar, is that of a stage play. The fact that a character does not come in until Act 3 does not mean that he is any the less carrying out the design of the author of the play to present the whole picture which the play embraces. It is a very useful analogy because it shows the position. That is one aspect of the law, and on that there is no doubt at all.
The other aspect of the law is as to how far those who act in consort to commit a crime are responsible for each other’s acts, that is, irrespective of the substantive offense of conspiracy. If one may take an example—a highly fantastic one but I think it raises the point—assume that you had a conspiracy on the part of road operators to wreck railway trains, and a number of road operators agreed in December to wreck a train on the 1st of January and to wreck a further train on the 1st of February. Between the 1st of January and the 1st of February, another road operator joins the conspiracy. I hope I have got rightly the point in My Lord’s mind and in the mind of the learned American Judge. Then there is, as far as I can see, some doubt as to whether that road operator would be liable for a murder committed in the wrecking that took place on the first of January.
I hope I have made my point clear. I am postulating someone who joins a conspiracy on the 15th of January, after the first wrecking has been carried out during which someone has been killed, and therefore those who consorted with regard to the first wrecking are guilty of murder. But as to the person who joins after that, there is some doubt as to whether he acquires retroactive responsibility. In English law it would appear to be at least doubtful—it certainly is arguable that in American law he would, as I have been told the decision.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you have made that very clear, Sir David, but what I am getting at is what the Prosecution claim in this case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry if I have been theoretical, but it has been rather a difficult point, and I wanted to relate it to the law with which I am most familiar.
With regard to the present case, the Prosecution say that the defendants do become responsible for the consequences of acts done in pursuance of the conspiracy. It is rather difficult to speak entirely in vacuo in the matter; but if one may take, for example—again I speak from memory—the Defendant Speer, who comes on the scene rather late, if my recollection is right, he then becomes minister for production and armaments and makes the demands for the slave labor which were fulfilled by the Defendant Sauckel.
In the submission of the Prosecution, there would not be any difficulty in convicting the Defendant Speer on all counts, assuming that the Tribunal accepted the evidence of the Prosecution. By his actions, he has conspired to commit a Crime against Peace; he has joined and entered into the conspiracy to carry on aggressive war; he has taken part in the waging of aggressive war by making the demands for the slave labor; he has instigated a war crime, namely the ill-treatment of populations of occupied countries; and also, by instigating and procuring the action of the Defendant Sauckel, he has committed Crimes against Humanity in that he has participated in actions which are condemned by the criminal law of all civilized countries; and probably—I am speaking from memory now—these actions have taken place in countries where it is arguable whether they were strictly occupied countries after an invasion, as in Czechoslovakia.