These organizations indoctrinated and practiced violence and terrorism. They provided the systematized, aggressive, and disciplined execution throughout Germany and the occupied countries of the plan for crimes which we have proven. The flowering of this system is represented in the fanatical SS General Ohlendorf, who told this Tribunal without shame or trace of pity how he personally directed the putting to death of 90,000 men, women, and children. No tribunal ever listened to a recital of such wholesale murder as this Tribunal heard from him and from Wisliceny, a fellow officer of the SS. Their own testimony shows the SS responsibility for the extermination program which took the lives of 5 million Jews—a responsibility that that organization welcomed and discharged methodically, remorselessly, and thoroughly. These crimes with which we deal are unprecedented, first because of the shocking number of victims. They are even more shocking and unprecedented because of the large number of people who united their efforts to perpetrate them. All scruple or conscience of a very large segment of the German people was committed to the keeping of these organizations, and their devotees felt no personal sense of guilt as they went from one extreme to another. On the other hand, they developed a contest in cruelty and a competition in crime. Ohlendorf, from the witness stand, accused other SS commanders whose killings exceeded his of “exaggerating” their figures.
There could be no justice and no wisdom in an occupation policy of Germany which imposed upon passive, unorganized, and inarticulate Germans the same burdens as upon those who voluntarily banded themselves together in these powerful and notorious gangs. One of the basic requirements both of justice and of successful administration of the occupation responsibility of our four countries is a segregation of the organized elements from the masses of Germans for separate treatment. That is the fundamental task with which we must deal here. It seems beyond controversy that to punish a few top leaders but to leave this web of organized bodies in the midst of postwar society would be to foster the nucleus of a new Nazidom. These members are accustomed to an established chain of centralized command. They have formed a habit and developed a technique of both secret and open co-operation. They still nourish a blind devotion to the suspended, but not abandoned, Nazi program. They will keep alive the hates and ambitions which generated the orgy of crime we have proven. These organizations are the carriers from this generation to the next of the infection of aggressive and ruthless war. The Tribunal has seen on the screen how easily an assemblage that ostensibly is only a common labor force can in fact be a military outfit training with shovels. The next war and the next pogroms will be hatched in the nests of these organizations as surely as we leave their membership with its prestige and influence undiminished by condemnation and punishment.
The menace of these organizations is the more impressive when we consider the demoralized state of German society. It will be years before there can be established in the German State any political authority that is not inexperienced and provisional. It cannot quickly acquire the stability of a government aided by long habit of obedience and traditional respect. The intrigue, obstruction, and possible overthrow which older and established governments always fear from conspiratorial groups is a real and present danger to any stable social order in the Germany of today and of tomorrow.
Insofar as the Charter of this Tribunal contemplates a justice of retribution, it is obvious that it could not overlook these organized instruments and instigators of past crimes. In opening this case I said that the United States does not seek to convict the whole German people of crime. But it is equally important that this Trial shall not serve to absolve the whole German people except 21 men in the dock. The wrongs that have been done to the world by these defendants and their top confederates were not done by their will and their strength alone. The success of their designs was made possible because great numbers of Germans organized themselves to become the fulcrum and the lever by which the power of these leaders was extended and magnified. If this Trial fails to condemn these organized confederates for their share of the responsibility for this catastrophe, it will be construed as their exoneration.
But the Charter was not concerned with retributive justice alone. It manifests a constructive policy influenced by exemplary and preventive considerations.
The primary objective of requiring that the surrender of Germany be unconditional was to clear the way for a reconstruction of German society on such a basis that it will not again threaten the peace of Europe and of the world. Temporary measures of the occupation authorities may by necessity, and I mean no criticism of them, have been more arbitrary and applied with less discrimination than befits a permanent policy. For example, under existing denazification policy, no member of the Nazi Party or its formations may be employed, in any position—other than ordinary labor—in any business enterprise, unless he is found to have been only a nominal Nazi. Persons in certain categories whose standing in the community is one of prominence or influence are required to be, and others may be, denied further participation in their businesses or professions. It is mandatory to remove or exclude from public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises persons falling within about 90 specified categories, deemed to consist of either active Nazis, Nazi supporters, or militarists. Property of such persons is blocked.
Now, it is recognized by the Control Council, as it was by the framers of this Charter, that a permanent long-term program should be based on a more careful and more individual discrimination than was possible with sweeping temporary measures. There is a movement now within the Control Council for reconsideration of its whole denazification policy and procedure. The action of this Tribunal in declaring, or in failing to declare, an accused organization criminal has a vital bearing on this future occupation policy.
It was the intent of the Charter to utilize the hearing processes of this Tribunal and its judgment to identify and condemn those Nazi and militaristic forces that were so strongly organized as to constitute a continuing menace to the long-term objectives for which our respective countries have spent their young lives. It is in the light of this great purpose that we must examine the provisions of this Charter.
It was obvious that the conventional litigation procedures could not, without some modification, be adapted to this task. No system of jurisprudence has yet evolved any satisfactory technique for handling a great number of common charges against a great multitude of accused persons. The number of individual defendants that fairly can be tried in a single proceeding probably does not greatly exceed the number now in your dock. Also, the number of separate trials in which the same voluminous evidence as to a common plan must be repeated is very limited in actual practice. Yet, adversary proceedings of the type in which we are engaged are the best assurance the law has ever evolved that decisions will be well-considered and just. The task of the framers of the Charter was to find some way to overcome the obstacles to practicable and early decision without sacrificing the fairness implicit in hearings. The solution prescribed by the Charter is certainly not faultless, but not one of its critics has ever proposed an alternative that would not either deprive the individual of all hearing or contemplate such a multitude of long trials that it would break down and be impracticable. In any case, this Charter is the plan adopted by our respective governments and our duty here is to make it work.
The plan which was adopted in the Charter essentially is a severance of the general issues which would be common to all individual trials from the particular issues which would differ in each trial. The plan is comparable to that employed in certain wartime legislation of the United States, dealt with in the case of Yakus versus United States, in which questions as to the due process quality of the order must be determined in a separate tribunal and cannot be raised by a defendant when he is defending on indictment. Those countries which do not have written constitutions and constitutional issues may find it difficult to follow the logic of that decision, but essentially the plan was to separate general issues relative to the order as a whole from specific issues which would arise when an individual was confronted with a charge of guilt.